


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16 Nov-82

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Legislative Liaison Division CIA

Louise Hoppe
Office of Congressional Relations
Department of StateA. M. Christopher
Office of Congressional and Public Affairs
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

FROM:

Stephen J. Flanagan
Professional Staff Member
Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Senate

DATE:

November 8, 1982

RE:

Proposed Itinerary for Field Trip to Europe by
the SSCI's Arms Control Working Group
29 November to 4 December 1982
or
6 to 11 December 1982Overview

The Arms Control Working Group of the Senate Intelligence Committee staff would like to take a fact-finding trip to Europe sometime in the next few weeks to meet with a variety of executive branch officials involved in the START, INF, and MBFR negotiations, and the SALT Standing Consultative Commission. The Group comprised of Michael Mattingly, Edward Levine, Eric Newsom and myself, would appreciate your assistance in making the necessary arrangements. This memorandum outlines the nature

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and purpose of this trip. Essentially we are interested in acquiring a fuller understanding of the negotiating process, with particular attention to intelligence-related aspects.

We would like to take this trip during either the week of 29 November or 6 December, if this is agreeable with members of the various delegations. We are flexible with regard to the schedule -- our only requirement is to be in Geneva at a time when START, INF and the SCC are all in session. We recognize that there are a number of Congressional delegations planning to descend on Geneva in the next few weeks and would hope to relieve the burden on the delegation by not requesting time-consuming background briefings. Rather, we would like to meet with the relevant officials from State, ACDA, DOD and the Intelligence Community for informal discussions about the specific issues outlined below.

Background

Since its formation in 1976 the Select Committee on Intelligence has monitored closely developments in the various arms control negotiations in which the United States has been involved, with particular attention to intelligence-related aspects of these discussions. The Committee has followed the progress of negotiations, the ability of U.S. capabilities to monitor existing and postulated limitations, and the status of compliance with agreements in effect. The staff's work in this

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regard has included: the preparation of briefings, hearings and memoranda for Committee members and other Senators; meetings with intelligence analysts, collection managers and personnel involved in support to the negotiations; and completion of both a major Committee report on U.S. capabilities to monitor the SALT II Treaty and several lesser memoranda on our ability to monitor nuclear test bans. Recently, Chairman Goldwater authorized the creation of an Arms Control Working Group to coordinate and focus the staff's continuing work in this area.

Purpose of the Trip

This fall the arms control agenda is very full with five different discussions underway in Europe. Four are in Geneva: the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); the negotiations on limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe (INF); the 20th semi-annual session of the SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC); and the second five-year review of the ABM Treaty mandated by Article XIV of that accord. The Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations are also continuing in Vienna. It is imperative that the Committee be fully and currently informed about these negotiations so that it can fulfill its mandated duties under S.Res. 400 and be prepared to report to the Senate on U.S. capabilities to monitor any agreements that may emerge.

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The Committee presently has an incomplete understanding of how the executive branch conducts these negotiations, and how intelligence and monitoring considerations are taken into account in the work of the several American delegations. It is important that the Committee develop a better appreciation of how the Intelligence Community ensures the protection of sources and methods when U.S. officials must raise sensitive issues with the Soviets, particularly compliance questions in the SCC. The Committee also needs some insight into the interaction and cooperation among diplomats, military officers and intelligence personnel on the various U.S. delegations. Another concern is the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community's counterintelligence support to U.S. negotiators regarding KGB and GRU intelligence collection, disinformation, and recruitment efforts. Similarly, the Committee should have a fuller understanding of the extent of CIA success in exploiting contacts with members of Soviet negotiating delegations to collect both positive foreign intelligence and counterintelligence data. In sum, there is no substitute for first-hand observation in order to gain a complete understanding of how the negotiating process works.

With these considerations in mind, the Arms Control Group has developed the following general agenda.

Brussels: One day of discussions with American and Allied officials at NATO Headquarters involved in planning

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for and support to the various negotiations. Of particular concern would be the effectiveness of bilateral and multi-lateral consultations with the Allies on the progress of the START and INF negotiations, and on monitoring concerns of special importance to NATO. The NATO and other allied mechanisms for discussing capabilities to monitor various types of limitations under consideration in the various negotiations, particularly MBFR, would also be of interest.

Geneva: Two and one-half days of discussions with American diplomatic and intelligence personnel involved in the START and INF negotiations and the current and special sessions of the SCC to review all of the above-outlined concerns.

Vienna: One day of meetings with U.S. representatives at the MBFR talks to discuss long-term prospects for an accord and how monitoring considerations have been factored into the various Western proposals. The Arms Control Group would also want to review how U.S. and other Western intelligence information relating to the negotiations is shared among the NATO participants in the negotiations.

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